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Abstract 
This paper examines the transparency of public-private partnerships (PPPs). The key question is “How 
has transparency and accountability been implemented in PPPs?”.PPPs in infrastructure have been 
presented as enabling synergy and as a major alternative to previous contracting out techniques. These 
partnerships have most usually involved the preferential use of private finance, highly complex 
‘bundled’ infrastructure delivery contract arrangements and new governance and accountability 
assumptions. Risk management is also particularly important to PPPs. Contracts between the 
governments and partnering private firms, however, have also been more complex and have not 
necessarily lead to simple synergy, but to more negotiations and governance structures. One ongoing 
concern from critics has been the accusation of illegitimacy due to the use by governments of these 
contracts to hold project information secret, rather than providing details of the deals to citizens. This 
paper first presents the transparency concept as it relates to modern day infrastructure PPPs. Second, 
the paper discusses how transparency and PPPs are related, and suggests a typology of transparency 
based on degree on openness and phases of the PPP process. Third, the paper examines empirical 
evidence on transparency elements in PPP contracts and governance structures based on two cases 
from Scandinavia and Australia.  Fourth, the paper concludes by observing how different transparency 
dimensions relate to the different phases in a  PPP project, including the important point about the 
contract institution that defines a PPP. The paper also concludes by suggesting some ways forward to 
improve transparency in future PPPs to enhance legitimacy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper examines transparency in public-private partnerships (PPPs). The paper uses some 
illustrations from Scandinavia and Australia where PPPs have developed differently. Scandinavia has had 
limited experience with PPPs. Some Australian states such as Victoria, have had full experience with 
PPPs. PPPs are new forms of organization that have risen in the last decades (Hodge, Greve & Boardman 
2011). There has been much debate about what PPPs are and how to best define them. Briefly, PPPs can  
be defined as “cooperation of some durability between public and private actors in which they jointly 
develop products and services and share risks, costs and resources which are connected with these 
products and services” (Van Ham & Koppenjan 2001: 598). They are a part of the broader New Public 
Management (NPM) (Hood 1991) agenda to use market mechanisms for public infrastructure and 
service delivery. PPPs also are an element in the wider cooperation and collaboration efforts between 
the public sector and the private sector that is part of the New Public Governance (NPG) agenda which is 
more recently described under the heading of “collaboration” (Kettl, 2002, 2009; Osborne ed. 2009). 
Transparency has become highly topical in literatures on public management and public governance in 
recent years (Hood & Heald, eds. 2006). Transparency is also now part of the current public 
management and governance reform agenda of which the Obama administration’s transparency policy 
is the most visible one (Coglianese 2009) .In recent years, transparency is becoming a topic for public 
policy researchers who are interested in the effects of the world wide web and its possibilities of 
disclosure and availability of information (Margetts 2006). Clearly, as well, transparency issues have 
found new life with the internet with wide coverage of phenomena such as the Wikileaks affair). 
Transparency issues in relation to PPPs are occurring because of this move towards including the private 
sector in public service and infrastructure provision. As Alasdair Roberts (2006: 117) noted, “(…) FOI 
(freedom of information, ed.) laws have been undercut by governmental experiments with new modes 
of delivering public services”. There is a widespread sentiment that transparency is threatened by PPPs 
or other market-type mechanisms. This leads to a potentially paradoxical situation: there is more focus 
on transparency as an issue in the public sector while more and more tasks are being moved away from 
the public sector and “privatized” or transferred to PPPs. 
The key research questions are therefore: How does the occurrence of PPPs affect transparency? What 
transparency measures and mechanisms exist for PPPs? How can transparency be improved in PPPs in 
the future? 
The hypotheses are the following: H1: PPPs made transparency for public services more difficult. H2: 
Transparency mechanisms for PPPs focus on the process and too little on the contract. H3: Transparency 
can be improved by attending more to the contract institution, but there will continue to be dilemmas 
and trade-offs attached to transparency in PPPs. 
This paper first presents a conceptual discussion on how “transparency” and “PPPs” can be understood. 
Second, the paper discusses how transparency and PPPs are related. The section presents a model on 
transparency in PPPs. Third, the paper reviews selected empirical evidence on transparency elements in 
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PPPs based on studies from Scandinavia and Australia. The Scandinavian countries have had relatively 
little experience with long-term infrastructure contract PPPs (LTIC-PPPs). Australia has been seen as one 
of the frontrunner countries in line with the UK and Canada. Fourth, a conclusion sums up the findings 
on transparency in PPPs, and has suggestions for some ways forward for improving transparency in 
PPPs.  
TRANSPARENCY  
Why has “transparency” become so topical? There are different answers to this question. Hood (2006, 
chapter 1), in an overview of the historical rise of transparency, has given some indications of why he 
believes transparency is now so strongly on the public governance agenda: First, a discussion on 
“openness between executive government and citizens. There is both a fundamental issue of 
governments being open and accessible to their citizens, and an issue of deliberative democracy where 
more views and perspectives are taken into consideration when making public policy decisions. The first 
issue has been pursued through “freedom of information acts” of which the US 1966 “Freedom of 
Information Act” and US the 1976 “Government in the sunshine Act” spawned many similar institutions 
around the world. Hood is quick to point out that some countries have much longer experiences to draw 
from, for example Sweden with its “Freedom of the Press Act that goes all the way back to 1766. Today 
we see organizations established to fight for freedom of information and accessible government, for 
example the American organization OMB Watch that was started by Gary Bass in 1983 
(www.ombwatch.org). The other issue is the belief in deliberate democracy and the point that 
democracy gets stronger if more people participate in democratic activities which means that they have 
to have access to information to act effectively as citizens. The broadened framework of participation 
also includes third sector organizations and NGOs. In the literature on public administration 
development, this is often referred to as part of a “good governance” agenda.  Second, the NPM 
movement preferred market-type mechanisms for public service delivery and envisaged the citizen-as-
consumer. For a consumer or customer to choose in a market place, there has to be transparency of 
prices and goods so the choice can be made rationally. NPM came to herald “cost centre” accounting 
that allowed for insights from citizens-as-consumers into what the public sector and private contractors 
were producing. Auditors came to play a more prominent role as someone who ensured that enough 
information was available and that public service producers had disclosed sufficient information. Third, 
there has been a discussion on transparency in the corporate governance literature. Corporate 
governance is concerned with the relationship between the owners, the boards and the chief executive 
officers. As Hood (2006: 17) explains that “(…) extensions of the obligations on corporations to disclose 
and publish information about themselves came steadily with the advance of regulation and with audit 
and accounting reforms ostensibly intended to produce “reassurance” (Power 1997) in the aftermath of 
multiple corporate failures and scandals. And the quantum extension of trading in securities in the 
twentieth century led to ever-increasing pressures on corporations to produce open and comparable 
information on all aspects of their activity for the benefits of investors or their agents (…)”(Hood 2006: 
17). 
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These three strands provide  some suggested answers to the “why transparency” question. But what is 
the concept of transparency as it is relevant  today, more specifically? From the literature, these 
meanings seem to be relevant: 
• Freedom of information for citizens 
• Openness in dealings by office-holders 
• Predictability in decision-making processes 
• Fighting corruption 
Nelson (2003) discusses four issues of transparency: Fullness of disclosure, the accessibility of 
documents, the timeliness of information availability and the mechanisms available for recourse and 
influence (Nelson 2003). Closely associated with “transparency” is also the concept of “accountability”. 
This concept, which at its core, means to give reasons for ones actions has been increasingly broadened 
over the years to now include the role of responsibility, the expectation to control (as distinct to simply 
giving an account after the event), and the desire to encourage responsiveness. Under this broader 
meaning, accountability is nowadays therefore firmly connected to notions of assessment, blame, 
redress, explaining and changing behaviour after failure as well as transparency, control, responsiveness 
and improving performance through  investigating and scrutinising; Hodge (2008).  
  
 The internet and data-driven government has accelerated these issues. Helen Margetts (2006) has 
discussed this development and there is now a whole movement focusing on watching governments 
(OMB Watch and others). Transparency policy under Obama has also accelerated this discussion. Obama 
made transparency a key part of his public management and governance reform the first day he took 
over as president of the USA. The Obama government has published websites such as recovery.gov and 
USAspending.gov which call for more open government. Technology can greatly enhance how people 
and the media can access information. 
A Model of Transparency? 
One way to define transparency has been to say that it is “the degree to which government information 
is available (Piotrowski and Borry 2009). As Coglianese (2009: 30) observed writing from the US 
perspective: “The Bush-to-Obama transition reveals that the most important challenge for open 
government is not secrecy versus transparency but figuring out how much transparency, and what type 
to have over the governmental process”. Heald  (2006)has suggested a model of transparency. Heald 
discusses four directions for transparency: 1) transparency upwards (in hierarchies), 2) transparency 
downwards (to citizens), 3) transparency outwards (the activity of observing the peers and/or 
competitors), and 4) transparency inwards (when those outside can observe what is going on inside, see 
the FOI measures. 
Heald also distinguishes between event versus process transparency, transparency in retrospect versus 
transparency in real time; nominal versus effective transparency and the timing of the introduction of 
transparency.  
5 
 
Concerning the distinction between “event” and “process”, Heald has the following to say: “In the case 
of event transparency (…), the objects of transparency can be input, outputs or outcomes. In the case of 
process transparency, the components are procedural and operational aspects” (Heald 2006: 29). 
We think that the distinction makes sense, but we would like to suggest a third category which will be 
relevant for public-private cooperation: Much of the focus in PPPs is related to what the contract as an 
institution is, and how it is interpreted in law. Adding “institution” to “event” and “process” may help 
the analysis of transparency in PPPs and other instances where market mechanisms are employed to 
produce public services. 
Limitations of transparency? 
Roberts (2006) point to the fact that government officials are likely to informally to adopt strategies to 
counter more openness and transparency. These moves can come in many forms, and Roberts lists 
some of them, including spinning the media.  
Another issue is the limits that are always included in FOI acts. There are certain topics and dealings that 
are excluded from transparency, for example measures related to national security. More widely, 
governments are trying to protect their core interests. For private sector companies, commercial 
confidentiality is an important underpinning of private markets operating to reward (or punish) 
innovation in commercial decision making. This notion is also one of the key aspects when market-type 
mechanisms are applied to public infrastructure and service delivery. 
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 
We have already noted the Van Ham and Koppenjan definition of PPP: (viz. ‘cooperation between 
public-private actors in which they jointly develop products and services and share risks, costs and 
resources which are connected with these products and services’). But partnerships between the public 
and private sectors come in many forms.  Hodge and Greve (2007) and others have each defined 
partnerships as encompassing several different families of activities. And the desire to more clearly 
articulate public-private partnership continues. Thinking about infrastructure partnerships, for example, 
a recent OECD report defined PPPs as ‘an agreement between government and one or more private 
partners (which may include the operators and the financers) according to which the private partners 
deliver the service in such a manner that the service delivery objectives are aligned with the profit 
objectives of the private partners and where the effectiveness of the alignment depends on a sufficient 
transfer of risk to the private partner’ (OECD 2008: 17). Whilst this definition has some advantages, it 
does not include the non-profit sector where voluntary organizations cooperate with the government, 
and therefore the definition ought to be extended to also include the non-profits.  
In the United Nations, PPPs are defined as ‘voluntary and collaborative relationships between various 
parties, both state and non-state, in which all participants agree to work together to achieve a common 
purpose or undertake a specific task and to share risks and responsibilities, resources and benefits’ (UN 
General Assembly 2005, p. 4; cited in Bull 2010: 480). Such partnerships can include those oriented 
towards resource mobilization, advocacy and policy goals as well as long term operations.  
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There are several crucial concepts here. One concept is ‘risk’. In almost all definitions, sharing of risks in 
an explicit way is mentioned as one of the key aspects of PPP. This differs from earlier ideas on risk 
sharing through contracting out / outsourcing arrangements where this was more implicit1
The last few decades has indeed shown that PPP comes in many shapes and sizes. One s most visible 
form of recent partnership has been the long-term infrastructure contract partnership (LTIC).The LTIC is 
organized around a design, finance, build, own, operate, transfer model and involves private sector 
financing and private sector project management capabilities. Historically, too, the urban development 
and downtown renewal experience of the US from the 1960s onwards saw close redevelopment 
partnerships as a visible and important PPP form; Bovaird (2010; 50). Another form is the widespread 
cooperation with between governments and non-profit organizations. This has been a tradition in some 
countries, especially in the USA where non-profit sector organizations run many public services 
(Amirkhaynan 2010; Kettl 2009). In the UK, there has been a debate on ‘the big society’ since Prime 
Minister David Cameron took office. Recently, ‘the big society’ is also meant to be a guide for a research 
effort though universities express misgivings about that (The Guardian 24 March 2011). There are also 
other, newer forms of partnering where the public sector and the private sector team up in new 
innovative formats to solve common challenges. ‘Gate21’ is a current example of a partnership on 
environmental issues. Gate 21 – sustainable future forum’ was begun by a local government, but quickly 
adopted relationships with other local governments, private sector companies and non-profit 
organizations as well as universities and housing associations (
. Another key 
concept is ‘innovation’: the public sector and the private sector have to come up with new solutions and 
‘work together or achieve a common purpose’. More is expected of PPPs than just ‘ordinary’ 
collaboration. As well, there is also usually a sense of hope that the relationship is a long term one – and 
desirably longer than the temporary relationship achievable through traditional ‘contracting-out’ of 
services.  Additionally, many partnerships entertain the notion of a certain degree of power sharing 
whilst working together jointly.  
www.gate21.dk). 
PPPs are moreover found at various levels of government. From regional partnerships between local 
governments and local private sector companies or associations to national governments that team up 
with national companies or associations to international organizations that team up with multinational 
companies (Skanska) or associations (the Red Cross). There are of course a number of combinations 
possible within that framework (Donahue). Some challenges arise when local governments try to deal 
with global partners, or when national governments want to form partnerships with multinational 
companies. 
PPPs are also clearly more than projects (the building of a hospital or the building of a bridge). PPPs are 
now also associated with policies on how the government should interact with the private sector in 
order to improve public services or create innovation (the recent Danish government ‘Strategy for 
public-private partnerships and markets’ is an example of this). At the UN level, there is a PPP policy 
(Bull 2010). At an even broader level, PPPs could be a metaphor or a brand for how governments want 
their interaction with society viewed2
                                                          1 See (Montiero 2010) who sees risk explicitly at the centre of the OECD definition of PPP performance. In the OECD’s own words, ‘the effectiveness of the alignment depends on a sufficient transfer of risk to the private partner’. 
, or alternatively, how they want the role of government in the 
economy viewed. And at a broader level still, the UN’s Millenium Declaration (and the subsequent 
establishment of the Millenium Development Goals) saw partnership being used in the context of 
2 See Klijn 2010. 
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developed countries having a role in aiding developing countries; goal eight here was to achieve a 
‘global partnership for development’ through various means3
Perhaps it makes sense to view PPP as being understood at many different levels. Hodge (2010b) 
formulated it in this way: PPPs can be understood in terms of four distinct but interconnected levels of 
meaning: as (1) a specific project or activity, (2) an infrastructure delivery mechanism or organizational 
form, (3) a policy statement as to the wide variety of ways the private sector can cooperate with 
government and  the role of the government in today’s mixed economy, and (4) as a governance tool or 
symbol. All of these meanings, too, exist in a broader historical context and set of cultural  assumptions. 
What this means is that there are indeed multiple meanings being constantly given to the phrase PPP. It 
not only means different things to different people (because they may talk of different members of the 
various PPP families and use the same label for these alternative forms). It also importantly means that 
in talking of PPP success, for example, PPP success may reside in any one of these four levels; at the 
single project; the delivery mechanism level; at the policy level; or at the governance level. Multiple 
grammars indeed!     
. 
 
The PPP model 
PPPs have often been described in terms of long-term infrastructure contracts (LTIC-PPPs). There is a 
long historical pedigree to PPPs and the private funding of public infrastructure also goes back centuries; 
Wettenhall 2010; Bovaird, 2010. Whilst the partnership story has multiple sources, two are of particular 
interest to modern infrastructure PPPs. The first was the use of the private sector in the US  to fund and 
complete the challenge of down town urban renewal and redevelopment in the 1960s and 1970s. Billed 
as ‘public-private partnership’, these initiatives were the recent source of the PPP grammar. The second 
source was the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) in the UK.  In this case, the comprehensive policy 
preference of UK governments to use private finance and bundled contracts pushed the PFI to global 
prominence. Tony Blair’s labelling of the PFI project as PPP was a political masterstroke, however, and 
catapaulted the idea into popularity (Hellowell 2010). A significant attraction to governments of the 
private financing of public infrastructure was that it managed to keep the financing “off balance sheet” 
for a considerable time period. 
The PPP model has been described in various ways, but a common understand is that it represents 
different phases or functions: Design, Finance, Build, Own, Operate, Transfer of DFBOOT – or some 
combination in between. Duffield (2010) lists a number of these combinations.  
PPPs have added a number of dimensions to the usually know outsourcing or contracting out of public 
services. One dimension is (1) risk sharing. Risk sharing is filled with challenges. A popular way of saying 
it is that the risks should be allocated to the sector that can bear the risk. (2) value for money: PPPs must 
secure value for money in terms of better outputs and/or outcomes. OECD aptly termed their 2008-
report on PPPs: “Public-Private Partnerships: In Pursuit of Risk Sharing and Value for Money”. (3) The 
creation of a new organization. When establishing a PPP, the most common way is to create a “Special 
Purpose Vehichle” (SPV) that embodies the partnership in a specific form.  The SPV is a legal body of its 
own, and often jointly owned by the partners (4) Potentially multiple public partners and multiple 
private partners that go together in consortia or teams. Usually, there are more public partners to a 
partnership, and more private companies that make up a consortium.  
                                                          3 Whilst the UN’s use of ‘partnership’ in the context of the MDGs strictly speaking calls on the developed countries to assist the developing countries, it is essentially a call for the wealth (both private and public) of developed countries to play a role in solving the common problem of poverty across developing countries.   
8 
 
Understanding Transparency in PPPs 
An understanding of transparency in PPPs may combine the insights by Heald, Nelson and others with 
the special characteristics of the PPP.  
• Heald (2006): Process and event. Added: Focus on institutions, particular the contract 
institution. 
• Criteria: Fullness of disclosure, the accessibility of documents, the timeliness of information 
availability and the mechanisms available for recourse and influence (Nelson 2003). 
The process can be divided into the following five phases: 
1. Pre-contractual phase (design, finance) 
2. Contractual allocation and contractual agreement (decision) 
3. Operational phase and forming an SPV (build, own, operate) 
4. Judgment phase and evaluation of output and outcome  
5. Decision on continuation or break (transfer)  
 
If we put these combinations – the dimensions of transparency and the stages of the PPP process, we 
get the following table. 
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 Fullness of 
disclosure 
Accessibility of 
documents 
Timeliness of 
information 
availability 
Mechanisms 
available for 
recourse and 
influence 
Phase 1 Example: 
Disclosure in the 
pre-contractual 
phase (process) 
   
Phase 2  Example: 
Accessibility of the 
contract (event, 
institution) 
  
Phase 3  Example: 
Accessibility to 
information on 
operating PPP 
company (process) 
  
Phase 4   Example: 
Timeliness of 
information of 
performance of 
PPP (event) 
 
Phase 5    Example: Influence 
on future of PPP 
project after 
performance 
review (event)  
 Table 1: Dimensions of Transparency and the Process of Private Partnerships 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOME LESSONS FROM SCANDINAVIA AND AUSTRALIA 
This section discusses some recent examples from Scandinavia and Australia. The case from Scandinavia 
is from Denmark, the case from Australia is from the state of Victoria. 
A Case of a PPP in Scandinavia (Denmark) 
The National Archive was one of the first new infrastructure being built as a PPP in Denmark.  The 
Danish government was looking for a project that would be suitable for trying out the PPP concept. 
Plans for a new national archive in the capitol of Copenhagen had been underway for some time, but 
there had been political disagreement over its finance and especially its placement. In 2004, the minister 
for economics and business affairs announced the following: “The building of the National Archive in 
central Copenhagen is now tendered as a PPP project. Minister for economics and business affairs, Mr 
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Bendt Bendtsen, and minister of cultural affairs, Mr Brian Mikkelsen, are now ready to launch the 
project. The choice of the private partner is expected to take place in 2005, building will commence in 
2006, and the archive should be ready for use in 2008-2009” (Press release 2 September 2004, Ministry 
of Business and Economics Affairs).  
There was a public debate as to whether a new archive was the best project to start the PPP policy 
initiative off with. Some argued that you only need one type ofNational Archive, and therefore it is not 
possible to construct a market for that particular kind of facility. Others argued that the government 
needed a project that could be launched without so much worry, and that was not going to be overtly 
controversial in the eyes of the taxpaying public.  The minister argued for the new PPP like this: 
“It is no secret that this government wants to secure value-for-money in national construction. With the 
launch of the first PPP project we think that we will have an efficient solution and draw many good 
lessons that benefit both this project and future PPP projects. The private partner shall not only be 
responsible for construction, but also be responsible for finance, maintenance and operatations” (ibid: 
2004). . In January 2005, the Copenhagen Local Government announced a “local planning initiative” 
about the National Archive and called for opinions about the project from the public. The official process 
for giving evidence and voicing opinion lasted from 23 June 2005 until 23 September 2005. In January, 
the Copenhagen Local Government proclaimed a new “local plan” for the area destined for the new 
National Archive. In 2006, the process began in earnest to find the private partners for the new archive 
The government stated that “the private partners is expected to own the building for about thirty years” 
(Press release 13 March 2006).  In 2006, there was a competitive tendering process for the contract for 
building the archive, and the winner was announced later. The government was following the European 
Union competitive tendering rules. These rules are meant to ensure that the contract is awarded fairly. 
In June 2007, the government signed a contract with the “Pihl consortium”; a consortium consisting of 
E.Pihl & Søn as the overall contractor, PLH Arkitekter as the architects or designers of the building, and 
Kemp and Lauritzen as the maintenance and operation’s company. The building itself is designed to be 
of a top modern standard and has two 15,5 meter high halls for storing material as well as 7 separate 
magazines of which four of them are designed to contain highly classified material from NATO and the 
intelligence services. The new magazines are designed to care for utmost security as well as 
environmentally friendly. 
Comments on governance and transparency 
The Danish National Archive PPP project was the first larger PPP project in Denmark, and therefore had 
much focus on it. It largely went without any sort of controversy. The government has been keen to 
promote the PPP project, but only up to a point. Ministers have not tried to “oversell” the PPP project as 
a big success. The competitive tendering process raised some interesting economic and financial issues, 
and there was some debate over whether the government could in fact have built the archive by itself 
without having a private finance partner in on the deal. The government made use of external 
consultants to help advice on the financial side of the partnership project.   
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As the government was saved any public embarrassment because of no visible scandals, the PPP project 
went smoothly ahead, and the building was finally taken into use in 2009. In the opening program for 
the government in November 2007, the government restated its broad support for a PPP policy (in the 
document “the society of possibilities” / mulighedernes samfund) 
A Case of a PPP in Australia (Victoria) 
The construction of Melbourne’s early CityLink transport project provides a relevant recent examples of 
major PPPs. This illustrates some of the important policy lessons to date and offers an opportunity for 
reflection. This case study, drawn from Hodge and Duffield (2010), are also interesting as they transcend 
multiple governments and multiple partnership policies in Victoria. 
 
Melbourne’s CityLink road infrastructure project is regarded as part of Australia’s PPP folklore and was 
an important early demonstration of recent PPP project delivery philosophy. As a case study, it 
demonstrated riskiness in both technological and political terms, innovation in the project arena and 
speed of delivery. 
 
The CityLink road infrastructure project was a massive BOOT22 undertaking. One of Australia’s largest 
recent public infrastructure projects, it became a symbol of the former Kennett government’s approach 
to public infrastructure. The CityLink project linked up three major freeways in Melbourne – the South 
Eastern, West Gate and Tullamarine Freeways through the construction of 22 km of road, tunnel and 
bridge works. The project involved the construction, operation and maintenance of several sections of 
roadway, including new and upgraded roads, some elevated, and 6 km of tunnels through difficult silt 
conditions as well as other works. Following an Environmental Effects Statement in 1994 and the 
subsequent public inquiry, a brief was issued calling for parties to register their interest in completing 
the project. Two consortia were chosen for further development of ideas for the links, and following a 
second project brief specifying requirements in 1995, the Transurban CityLink Ltd consortium was 
nominated as the preferred bidder4
 
. The estimated cost of the whole CityLink project was approximately 
AUS$2.1 billion, including AUS$1.8 billion financed by the consortium and AUS$346 million of associated 
works and other costs financed by the state. Opened over the period 2000/2001, the consortium has 
leased land from the state to operate a public toll- way for 34 years, with ownership reverting to the 
state at no cost and in a fully maintained condition. The predicted benefit–cost ratio for these works was 
2.0, with a net present value of AUS$1.3 billion according to economic studies. The Melbourne CityLink 
also indicated that initial investors should expect to receive a real rate of return of 17.5 per cent after 
tax for the life of the project. To govern the project, specific enabling legislation (the Melbourne CityLink 
Act 1995), was established, along with a statutory authority (the Melbourne CityLink Authority) as the 
state’s contract manager. This project also crossed the lives of two governments, and both sides of 
politics agreed to the need for this infrastructure. Indeed, after having previously identified this need, 
the former Kirner Labor government moved the project forward to the stage of bidding documentation. 
The new Kennett Liberal government then reviewed this documentation and renegotiated the deal. This 
paved the way for the PPP mechanism. 
But several factors then made this project a divisive political hotbed. Forecasts of net project benefits 
varied wildly. Accusations were also made that favourable treatment was given to the consortium and 
that misleading environmental impact emission information on tunnel air quality was provided by the 
                                                          
4 Transurban CityLink Ltd is a joint venture between Transfield Pty Ltd and Obayashi Corporation. 
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consortium to the government’s MCLA. Also, amidst water shortages for citizens, Melbourne’s drinking 
water was for some time being pumped into the tunnel surrounds to ameliorate a lowered groundwater 
table and structural problems with the tunnel. 
 
After cracks began to appear in the tunnel walls (not acknowledged by CityLink until 17 months later), 
the tunnel needed to be redesigned in 1998. Further engineering problems also delayed the tunnel 
opening. State- of- the- art electronic technology was tested, almost on the run. Additionally, direct 
tolling (rather than a shadow toll paid by government based on traffic volumes) probably diverted 
between 15 and 37 per cent of traffic off the link and into adjacent side streets (Russell et al., 2000). A 
constant stream of legal controversies in the CityLink project between members of the consortium 
alleged various contract breaches for cost overruns, construction delays and faulty design. Even the 
government itself was accused of delays and breaches of contract, and it alleged negligence by the 
builders and designers. These issues, along with the Kennett government’s use of a ‘crash- through’ 
political culture legitimized through the legal powers of the project5
 
, provided a colourful cocktail of 
politics and power to deliver this PPP. 
Overall, then, substantial risks were indeed transferred to the private sector in this project. Private 
contractors, for instance, bore almost all of the construction risks, along with most of the design, 
construction, operating, financing and market risks based on the contract6
 
. Also, the majority of the 
legal conflicts were between private parties, with few involving the government directly – despite the 
good newspaper copy. Overall, then, we might conclude that most of these commercial risks were 
indeed borne by the private sector investors and that they deserved to earn a margin.  
Comments on governance and transparency  
Interestingly, though, whilst the commercial and technical aspects of the project were generally 
positively regarded, this cannot be said of governance matters. And lack of transparency in the private 
contract as well as other secrets being held inside government were central to many of the concerns 
voiced. The forecasts of net project benefits (which varied wildly) were initially inaccessible to the 
public. Additionally, no comparison had occurred between undertaking this task in the public or private 
sectors. Moreover, the Victorian Freedom of Information Act did not apply to this ‘special project’. So 
amidst the accusations of favourable treatment to the consortium and misleading environmental impact 
emission information on tunnel air quality, the arrangements were deemed to be illegitimate until 
proven otherwise. Other governance shortcomings were also evident. This partnership deal was 
essentially a two- way affair rather than including citizens’ interests directly. The state’s enabling 
legislation even provided scope to override any potential delays from the normal complications of ‘due 
process’. There was no separate provision for the protection of consumers, and little apparent concern 
that the concession period might in the end be as high as 54 years in an effort to achieve profitability for 
the consortium. Magnifying long- term governance policy concerns, the former state treasurer, an 
ardent supporter of privatization policies and PPPs, took on a top job with Macquarie Bank in its 
Infrastructure Investment Group, to lead future PPP efforts. Importantly, the precise contractual 
conditions which the state had agreed to were not made accessible to the public until the Kennett 
government had been voted out and a new government held a high level Inquiry into this contract deal. 
                                                          
5 The often cited example here was the use of the State’s infringement notice system of debt collection.  
6 From a technical point of view the CityLink project was indeed a very challenging one, requiring a large technical advance in the tolling 
technology, real construction risks in tunnelling through soft Yarra River River silt and considerable risks in environment issues concerning air 
quality and the height of the water table around the river. The private sector took on these risks fully and in accordance with the signed 
contracts. 
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There has been disappointingly little debate on whether the CityLink achievements were worth the price 
paid. Investors’ interests were protected over citizens’ interests, with high returns to private investors 
being achieved by minimizing risks through concession deed arrangements. The financial arrangement 
for the annual concession fee payable to the state for this monopoly facility was also far from clear, 
despite assurances to the contrary. The high level review by a team of lawyers of metres of legal 
documents found that payment by the contractor to the state for this monopoly facility could, at the 
contractor’s choice, vary by a factor of four depending on timing options and only if both a reasonable 
rate of return had been earned by the private investors and if sufficient cash flow were available. In 
other words, it was not at all clear, even when the contract documentation had been analyzed, what the 
‘deal’ was that the state had committed itself to. Citizens of Victoria paid a price in terms of lack of 
clarity here as well as a financial price. Considerable uncertainty existed until recently, when the deal 
was reappraised by the State’s Auditor General. Clearly, the state should in future avoid, where possible, 
contractual obligations that affect its discretion for up to 54 years, and regulatory powers should be 
established for such projects through the state’s independent regulatory authorities such as the 
Essential Services Commission. Critics also stressed that future projects should be subject to stronger 
parliamentary and public scrutiny before implementation. 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION: TRANSPARENCY IN PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS  
The OECD states that “ready access to information at all stages of PPP procurement assists both the 
public and private partners, and improves transparency, accountability and management of projects” 
(OECD 2008: 125). OECD goes on to say that “For the public, transparency helps to ensure that a project 
is fair and that the planned costs are open for public scrutiny. For private firms, too, access to PPP data, 
particularly from past tenders and from ongoing project evaluations , will provide a better chance for 
robust project development and competitive modeling” (OECD 2008: 126). We agree with these 
statements.   
But transparency comes in many forms and whilst in a technical sense more information is nearly always 
better, this clearly can conflict with the need in politics to push through project s which may be 
unpopular, and blunt the attacks of government’s critics.   
In this paper we have described the main dimensions of transparency and the phases of the PPP 
development. There are a couple of issues that could be raised in relation to this: (1) Transparency is 
present at different stages of a PPP development.  (2) “Less transparency” has not been a direct goal of 
PPP policy, but can be a consequence of using contracts and PPPs for public infrastructure building, and 
also inclusion of private partners in public policy more broadly.  
Transparency is present at different stages of a PPP development:  Transparency understood as 
disclosure of information and accessibility of information is especially present in the pre-contractual 
phase. In Denmark, the local government announced a “local planning initiative”, necessary by law, that 
calls for opinions and evidence for a set period. Citizens and organizations can voice and submit their 
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opinion on the project. The project’s plans are made available for citizens to examine.  Accessibility of 
documents only concerns the general plans, not the financial proposals put forward by private 
companies. In the competitive tendering process, the process is guided by tendering rules. In Europe, 
these are guided by the European Union procurement rules that are meant to secure a competitive 
bidding process, and that must work against corruption. The institution of the contract is what sets PPPs 
(and contracting out/outsourcing) apart from legislation in a Parliament or Congress. When awarding a 
contract, the principles of commercial confidentiality will be influential. Transparency understood as 
timeliness of information is important it concerns the issue of when government can release 
information on contracts. In the period after the contract is signed, the maintenance and operation is 
taken care of by a private company or a Special Purpose Vehicle, and there is less transparency. 
Judgments about what type of infrastructure and services are delivered is bound to come in full only 
after the contract has expired, and that is 30 years away for some projects. Therefore, there has to be 
some intermediate goals and milestones that progress can be assessed from.  This is in line with the 
points made earlier by Hood, Fraser and McGarvey (2006), for example when they observe that 
“However, such data collection and transparency of information about PFI (private finance initiative, 
ed.) contracts are most notable by their absence. From a political point, PFI has thrown up many issues 
concerning accountability and transparency. PFI contracts appear immune to the normal welter of 
oversight, regulatory, and scrutiny mechanisms that other public services face” (ibid: 43). 
“Less transparency” has not been a direct goal of PPP policy, but can be a consequence of using 
contracts and PPPs for public infrastructure building, and also inclusion of private partners in public 
policy more broadly: Governments around the world, including in Scandinavia (Denmark) and Australia 
have set out to create value-for-money, make long term planning possible and make room for 
innovation when they establish PPP. They have not deliberately wanted to reduce transparency or 
conceal important information as such. However, when PPPs are established, the signing of a legal 
contract is one of the key aspects of a PPP, and that contract creates a legal body called the Special 
Purpose Vehicle.  Another aspect is that the contracts are often very complex documents that need 
lawyers, financial experts and accountants to comprehend and understand. As Hood, Fraser & McGarvey 
(2006: 43) noticed, “the detailed and technical nature of many of the projects means that politicians 
often lack the know-how and expertise to understand the implications for the short-, medium- and long-
term public finances”.  The Australian case of the CityLink project in Victoria is evidence of the same 
issue. The deal is highly complex and is not something easily accessible to politicians, let alone the media 
or the wider public. The lack of disclosure of material is a “side-effect” of having a commercial contract 
that gives the operational responsibility to a private sector-led consortium. 
PPPs continue to be important instruments and institutions in the policy challenges facing nations in the 
coming years. It is therefore crucial that the discussion on transparency for these large infrastructure 
projects begin to take form. One step is to ensure that the groundwork is prepared competently as 
witnessed by the GAO (2008) in the US in their analysis of the highway sector: “More rigorous upfront 
analysis could better secure potential benefits and protect the public interest”. The auditors and the 
audit offices play a key role in securing better transparency here. A recent meeting of European auditors 
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(Bundesrechnungshof 2011) emphasized the need to be more precise about what is expected of 
auditors, and to reconsider if auditors got sufficient competencies and skills to be able to scrutinize the 
complex PPP deals. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper makes two primary contributions. First, it identifies and traces the development of the 
relationship between transparency and PPPs. Transparency has been a major policy issue, most recently 
named by the Obama Administration in the US as a key ingredient in the current US public management 
and governance reforms in the federal government. Transparency has also been an issue for 
organisazations such at the OECD and the European Union. In this paper, we have identified 
transparency as having at least four elements: degree of disclosure of information, accessibility of 
information, timeliness of information and recourse and influence. Transparency is overall about the 
degree to which government information is available, following Piotrowski & Borry. Transparency for 
PPPs must be analyzed in terms of the different phases of a PPP project. In the pre-contractual phase, 
transparency is more likely to place than in the awarding of the contract itself, and transparency in 
terms of accessibility of information becomes harder once the contract is signed and the PPP 
organization, the “Special Purpose Vehicle” has been established. Recourse and influence may depend 
heavily on the way the contract is written and the context of the contractual institutions.  
Less transparency is not a direct purpose of PPPs, but a significant consequence of more PPPs. While 
countries around the world have been preoccupied with getting more value for money and promoting 
innovation as main drivers for wanting PPPs in the first place, a key effect of establishing PPPs is often 
that there less transparency in the economic deals and contractual realities than had the project been a 
pure public undertaking. If governments decide to use private sector organizations more in the future, 
there will be a need to consider the transparency issues more seriously.  The paper has tried to illustrate 
this issues by providing recent examples from Scandinavia (Denmark) and Australia (Victoria). We 
examined the two infrastructure cases briefly: the constructing of a new National Archive in 
Copenhagen, Denmark, and the construction of the EastLink project in Melbourne, Victoria. Both 
projects are bigger infrastructure projects, and while they are transparent to some extent, the 
contractual complexity and the presence of the private companies make transparency issues more 
complicated. 
Around the world, there is a movement to reconsider the PPP policy in light of the global financial crisis. 
This will be a relevant opportunity to review the transparency issues for PPPs again, and to help secure a 
stronger degree of disclosure-, accessibility- and timeliness of information while thinking about how to 
influence PPP decisions in the future. 
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